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Problem solving research has encountered an impasse. Since the seminal work of Newell und 
Simon (1972) researchers do not seem to have made much theoretical progress (Batchelder 
and Alexander, 2012; Ohlsson, 2012). In this paper we argue that one factor that is holding back 
the field is the widespread rejection of introspection among cognitive scientists. We review 
evidence that introspection improves problem solving performance, sometimes dramatically. 
Several studies suggest that self-observation, self-monitoring, and self-reflection play a key 
role in developing problem solving strategies. We argue that studying these introspective pro-
cesses will require researchers to systematically ask subjects to introspect. However, we docu-
ment that cognitive science textbooks dismiss introspection and as a consequence introspec-
tive methods are not used in problem solving research, even when it would be appropriate. We 
conclude that research on problem solving would benefit from embracing introspection rather 
than dismissing it.
Correspondence:
Frank Jäkel, Institute of Cognitive  
Science, Universität Osnabrück.  
Email: fjaekel@uos.de
Keywords:
introspection, problem solving, 
metacognition, verbal reports, think 
aloud
In contemporary cognitive science introspection is widely 
regarded as a mysterious and problematic method for un-
covering the operations of the mind. Most researchers will 
typically avoid the conceptual and methodological minefield 
of introspection. Johnson-Laird (2008, p. 17), in the context 
of reasoning, expresses an attitude towards introspection 
that many cognitive scientists share: “To reason is to carry 
out a mental process. Introspection doesn’t reveal to us how 
that process works. (If it did, then psychologists would have 
understood how it worked long ago.) Hence the process is 
unconscious.” There are good reasons to be skeptical about 
the usefulness of introspection as a method in many areas of 
perception and cognition. Many processes are unconscious 
and hence, by definition, unaccessible for introspection. 
From this, however, it does not follow that introspection has 
no role to play in psychological research or that introspec-
tion is not an interesting process worthy of study in itself. 
In the context of problem solving it is important to stress 
that introspection is, at least sometimes, an essential part of 
problem solving processes. When dealing with new or hard 
problems that cannot be solved by standard methods, good 
problem solvers introspect while they engage with their task: 
they examine their strategies and representations, they evalu-
ate their progress, and they realize that they are stuck or that 
they have had an insight. Understanding often seems to de-
pend on some form of conscious and deliberate reflection 
on one’s own thoughts. These are salient phenomena that we 
should not ignore. In the literature, the dubious term intro-
spection is often avoided and is replaced with notions such as 
self-observation, self-monitoring, self-reflection, or metacog-
nition, but also these terms remain mysterious (Brown, 1987). 
We, thus, believe that research on problem solving, at some 
point, will have to face squarely the conceptual muddle sur-
rounding introspection, metacognition, and consciousness. 
Problem solving research has encountered an impasse. We 
are fixated on problem solving as search and we are spending 
most of our (re)search time in problem spaces that do not 
seem to bring us closer to the ill-defined goal of understand-
ing the general principles underlying problem solving. The 
work by Newell and Simon (1972) was a real breakthrough 
that allowed us to investigate the mechanics of well-defined 
search problems. Contrary to the high hopes in the early 
days of cognitive science no general problem solving theory 
emerged. While we can formalize the representations and 
the steps subjects take in a search problem, we do not under-
stand how they choose between different problem represen-
tations, different search algorithms, and different heuristics. 
An accepted formal theory that can describe how representa-
tions and heuristics are attained and adapted is still missing. 
The same is true for a formal theory of insight. Several people 
have commented on this state of affairs at a recent workshop 
that inspired this paper (van Rooij et al., 2011). Two recent 
papers in this journal also offer an analysis of the current 
impasse in problem solving research (Batchelder and Alex-
ander, 2012; Ohlsson, 2012). We would like to add to these 
commentaries that, perhaps, the widespread rejection of in-
trospection among cognitive scientists is one of the factors 
that is holding back the field. 
A computer scientist who had started to do experiments 
on problem solving told the first author that they wanted to 
interview their participants about their problem solving strat-
egies for a newly developed set of problems. However, when 
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they consulted with an experimental psychologist they were 
advised to focus on collecting hard data, like performance 
measures, and to avoid verbal reports and introspection. We 
think that most cognitive scientists will react in the same way 
if a computer scientist who wants advice on running experi-
ments approaches them. But is this good advice? The argu-
ment that we would like to put forward in this opinion paper 
is the following: cognitive scientists have good reasons to be 
skeptical about introspection as a research method but self-
imposed experimental rigor can get in the way of exploratory 
research. A systematic introspective study is a good way to get 
experience with a new experimental paradigm and to explore 
possible problem solving strategies that subjects might be us-
ing in the task. In this way, introspection can help develop 
new hypotheses and ultimately, perhaps, help overcome the 
impasse the field is facing. Furthermore, in problem solving 
research the rejection of introspection is particularly harm-
ful because introspection, in the sense of self-observation, 
is a crucial component of some problem solving processes. 
Hence, we will argue that research on problem solving could 
benefit from being more open-minded about introspection, 
both as a method and as a cognitive phenomenon. 
To avoid misunderstandings right from the start, we are 
very aware of the big conceptual and methodological prob-
lems that introspection raises and readers should not expect 
that we offer any solutions or easy-to-follow recommenda-
tions for running introspective studies. We do not think 
that there are new arguments or new suggestions in this pa-
per. After all, the controversies surrounding introspection 
have been raging for a very long time. In fact, our two main 
points—that (a), introspection can be good for exploratory 
studies, and (b), introspection is an interesting cognitive pro-
cess in itself—have often been made (e.g., Dörner, 1979; Er-
icsson and Simon, 1993, 1998; Ericsson, 2003; Fellows, 1976; 
Flavell, 1976; Reither, 1979). The aim for this opinion paper 
is merely to reiterate these two points in the context of prob-
lem solving and, hence, to point to one potential block that, if 
removed, might allow problem solving research to progress. 
In the following, we first survey common attitudes towards 
introspection in cognitive science and try to explain why cog-
nitive scientists are often overly skeptical of introspection. We 
believe that this skepticism is a major block for problem solv-
ing research. In order to remove this block, we will discuss 
examples of successful exploratory research in cognitive sci-
ence that used questionable introspective methods. We will 
argue that, as problem solving research is stuck, it is a good 
idea to temporarily trade experimental rigor for exploratory 
introspective methods. Our main argument, however, is that 
self-observation is a form of metacognition that is an impor-
tant part of problem solving processes and, hence, needs to 
be studied as a cognitive process. This is done most easily by 
explicitly asking subjects to introspect. We will review a selec-
tion of studies that, we think, have already moved in the right 
direction and we will suggest some ways to proceed. 
IntrospectIon and cognItIve scIence
Cognitive scientists like to compare themselves to particle 
physicists in that the object under investigation cannot be 
observed directly. Instead they must conduct cleverly de-
signed experiments that allow them to draw inferences about 
what is going on inside a black box that they cannot open. 
These inferences are based on theories that are tested and fal-
sified through rigorous experimental methods. 
This self-image is based on a caricature of the history of 
psychology. For a long time psychology was the business of 
armchair philosophers. As a consequence, early experimen-
tal research in psychology was based on introspection but 
was a failure due to introspection being unreliable. Behavior-
ists put psychology on a solid methodological foundation by 
relying only on observable behavior. In this narrative cog-
nitive scientists save the day by studying the unobservable 
mind while also being methodologically rigorous. 
Although this narrative seems very convincing and can be 
found in many textbooks, it is not accurate from a historical 
point of view. The battles between behaviorists and cognitiv-
ists get all the attention, but there is also a story to be told 
about the relationship between cognitive science and the ear-
lier, so-called introspective psychology (Brock, 2013; Costall, 
2006; Greenwood, 1999). 
As introspection is a difficult term and has different con-
notations in different contexts, let us first state explicitly 
which contexts we will not be concerned with in the follow-
ing. We will neither be concerned with the casual introspec-
tion of folk psychology nor with analytic introspection, nor 
phenomenology. The context that is relevant for us here is 
the experimental work on thinking that students of Külpe 
established in Würzburg at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. They were the first ones to study thinking experimen-
tally and they did so by means of systematic experimental in-
trospection. Briefly, in introspection the subject carries out a 
task that was set by the experimenter. Directly after complet-
ing the task, she explains the course of her thoughts to the 
experimenter who can also ask specific questions about the 
subjects’ thoughts. The books by Jean and George Mandler 
offer an excellent introduction to this line of work and also 
trace its influence on modern cognitive science (Mandler 
and Mandler, 1964; Mandler, 2007). 
As we will also discuss think-aloud methods, let us also, 
right from the start, distinguish them from introspective 
methods. Both kinds of methods require participants to give 
verbal reports and are therefore related and often treated to-
gether in the literature. We will follow Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) and distinguish different types of verbal reports based 
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on the presumed underlying cognitive processes. When par-
ticipants think aloud they merely report the thoughts they 
are having anyway, either in the form of inner speech or in a 
format that is easily translated into speech. This is achieved 
by training subjects to utter everything that comes to their 
mind, however incoherent it is, and by minimizing interac-
tion with the experimenter. Hence, think-aloud methods are 
often considered to be theoretically and methodologically 
relatively unproblematic, albeit hard to analyze. In contrast, 
in introspective methods—where the experimenter ques-
tions the subject—there are several additional metacogni-
tive processes: observing thoughts, reflecting on them and 
ordering them so that they can be explained coherently to 
the experimenter. These additional metacognitive process-
es are not understood very well, they may distort and bias 
the reports, and they may even interfere with the cognitive 
processes that we want to study. Introspective methods are, 
therefore, problematic from a theoretical and methodologi-
cal point of view. With the term introspection we lump to-
gether the ill-understood and problematic metacognitive 
processes that are central to introspective methods and that 
distinguish them cognitively from think-aloud methods. 
survey of cognItIve scIence textbooks
If one wants to get an overview of common attitudes towards 
introspection among cognitive scientists, looking at text-
books is a good place to start. We therefore looked at a conve-
nience sample of cognitive science textbooks (see Table 1). We 
searched the index and the table of contents for the term intro-
spection and checked which kind of introspection (folk psy-
chological, analytical, phenomenological, experimental) the 
authors discussed and what their attitude was. We then looked 
more concretely for discussions of the work of the Würzburg 
school (including Otto Selz) to see whether the tradition that 
had a positive attitude towards experimental introspection 
for studying thinking is mentioned at all. As introspective 
methods are often grouped together with other kinds of ver-
bal reports, such as think-aloud methods or protocol analysis, 
we also searched for these terms. Furthermore, think-aloud 
methods can be thought of as an improvement and refine-
ment of the introspective methods that were pioneered by the 
Würzburg school. Hence, we expected that it is more likely 
that think-aloud methods, rather than introspective methods, 
are discussed. The famous body of work on problem solving 
by Newell and Simon relies heavily on think-aloud protocols1 
and so we also checked whether their work is covered.
Almost all of the books that mentioned introspection as 
a method dismissed it, mostly based on its unreliability or 
its uselessness for accessing the unconscious processes that 
underly cognition. Only four books gave any evidence or 
serious arguments for these claims. The popular book by 
Anderson (1990) and the book by Medin and Ross (1992) 
discuss early works of the Würzburg school. Eysenck and Ke-
ane (2000) discuss the problems of introspection but they do 
not mention the Würzburg school. Instead they discuss the 
debate between Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Ericsson and 
Simon (1980). The only book that gives a discussion of intro-
spection that is historically satisfying from the viewpoint of 
problem solving is Mayer (1992). This book is, however, un-
usual in that problem solving takes center stage. The remain-
ing books that mention introspection and dismiss it do not 
give convincing evidence for the claims that introspection is 
Introspection Würzburg Think Aloud Newell and Simon
Neisser (1967) X
Cohen (1977) X X
Glass, Holyoak, and Santa (1979) X X
Anderson (1990) X X X
Mayer (1992) X X X X
Medin and Ross (1992) X X X X
Stillings et al. (1995) X X
Green (1996) X X
Eysenck and Keane (2000) X X X
Reed (2004) X X
Friedenberg and Silverman (2006) X X X
Edelman (2008) X X
Bermúdez (2010) X
Goldstein (2011) X X X
Table 1.
In a convenience sample of cognitive science and cognitive psychology textbooks we found that many briefly mention introspec-
tion (mostly analytic introspection and seldom the Würzburg tradition) and dismiss it immediately. All of the books mentioned the 
work of Newell and Simon and most discussed it in great detail. Verbal protocols were not always mentioned together with Newell 
and Simon and often not discussed at all.
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unreliable or useless. We agree with Costall (2006) and Brock 
(2013) that the case against introspection is historically and 
factually not as clear as most textbooks make it seem. This 
suggests that introspection is ignored and rejected in cogni-
tive science not for empirical but for other reasons.2
While all textbooks reject introspection as a method, 
some of them discuss verbal reports, protocol analysis, or 
thinking aloud as a methodological improvement over in-
trospection (see Table 1). All of the books in our sample that 
have been published since the seventies discuss the work of 
Newell and Simon. They usually discuss Human Problem 
Solving (Newell and Simon, 1972) and give quite a lot of 
space to means-ends analysis.3
But, surprisingly, not all books discuss how Newell and 
Simon obtained their insights on human problem solving. 
They do not discuss Newell’s and Simon’s research strategy 
that relied heavily on verbal reports and think-aloud meth-
ods. In one chapter of their book they give a meticulous anal-
ysis of one protocol of one participant solving one problem, 
in order to demonstrate how, they think, research in problem 
solving should proceed. While 9 of the 14 books we looked 
at mentioned verbal reports only 6 can be said to give a sat-
isfactory account of the role of verbal reports for the work of 
Newell and Simon (Cohen, 1977; Glass, Holyoak, and Santa, 
1979; Goldstein, 2011; Mayer, 1992; Medin and Ross, 1992; 
Reed, 2004). It is puzzling that only half of the textbooks 
discuss thinking aloud in detail while all the textbooks talk 
about problem solving in the Newell and Simon tradition. 
InaccessIbIlIty of cognItIve processes
It is sometimes suggested that a verbal report is just a be-
havioristic name for introspective data (e.g., Costall, 2006). 
Despite the success that Newell and Simon had with using 
verbal reports, some authors might thus feel that methods 
for the elicitation of verbal reports are not generally reliable, 
hard to use, or only useful for informal explorations and 
should therefore not be taught in a textbook. Some authors 
of textbooks might implicitly side with Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) who assessed the reliability of introspection and ver-
bal reports in an influential paper. Their abstract starts with 
a crushing conclusion: “Evidence is reviewed which suggests 
that there may be little or no direct introspective access to 
higher order cognitive processes.” They go through a large 
number of studies and show that the reasons subjects give 
for their behavior are demonstrably different from the actual 
causes of their behavior. One explanation for these data is 
that introspective reports are merely post-hoc rationaliza-
tions. Subjects will use their folk psychological theories to 
explain their own behavior without having privileged access 
to the actual causes of their behavior. 
However, verbal reports are not just a behavioristic name 
for introspective data (see, e.g., Boring, 1953). Researchers in 
problem solving, early on, have tried to distance themselves 
from introspection as a method but at the same time en-
dorsed thinking aloud as a less problematic and very useful 
tool (e.g., Duncker, 1945, p. 2). Ericsson and Simon (1980) 
wrote a reply to Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and tried to set 
the record straight for cognitive science (see also White, 
1980). While the conclusions that Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
draw are correct for the studies they looked at, these studies 
invited post-hoc rationalizations by the subjects. In all of the 
studies that they reviewed, subjects were questioned casually 
about the reasons for their behavior after the experiment. 
The relevant question, however, is not whether casual intro-
spection is unreliable but under what conditions a system-
atic and controlled method for eliciting verbal reports can 
be reliable and useful. Given the progress that was made on 
human problem solving through the systematic use of verbal 
protocols, it is no surprise that Ericsson and Simon (1980, 
p. 247) conclude: 
For more than half a century, and as the result of an 
unjustified extrapolation of a justified challenge to a 
particular mode of verbal reporting (introspection), 
the verbal reports of human subjects have been thought 
suspect as a source of evidence about cognitive pro-
cesses. In this article we have undertaken to show that 
verbal reports, elicited with care and interpreted with 
full understanding of the circumstances under which 
they were obtained, are a valuable and thoroughly reli-
able source of information about cognitive processes. 
It is time to abandon the careless charge of “introspec-
tion” as a means for disparaging such data. They de-
scribe human behavior that is as readily interpreted as 
any other human behavior. To omit them when we are 
carrying the “chain and transit of objective measure-
ment” is only to mark as terra incognita large areas on 
the map of human cognition that we know perfectly 
well how to survey.
It is instructive to discuss one example of Nisbett and Wil-
son (1977) that deals with problem solving (the other exam-
ples belong to the realm of social psychology and are less in-
teresting for us here). Maier (1931) hung two cords from the 
ceiling and told subjects to tie them up. The cords, however, 
were so located that subjects could not reach both of them at 
the same time. Subjects could use whatever was available in 
the room to solve this problem. The solution that Maier want-
ed his subjects to come up with was to use a weight tied to a 
cord so that it can be set in motion, like a pendulum. Many 
subjects did not find this solution even after ten minutes of 
thinking. In these cases the experimenter would walk across 
the room and “accidentally” brush one of the cords so that it 
started swinging. 23 of 61 subjects solved the problem very 
shortly after having been given this cue (24 solved it before 
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being given the cue and 14 not at all). Afterwards subjects 
were asked how they solved the problem. Among these 23 
only 7 reported the cue although the remaining subjects were 
equally influenced by it, as Maier argued convincingly. This is 
definitely an interesting result. It can be concluded that after 
having found the solution most subjects did not know about 
the factors that led them there. In fact, these subjects reported 
that the solution just appeared to them as a whole. 
However, it is clearly a mistake to conclude from these data 
that subjects do not have any introspective access to their 
cognitive processes during problem solving. We do not know 
whether a better controlled and concurrent think-aloud in-
struction would have revealed that subjects noticed the cue 
and what intermediate steps they went through. Perhaps they 
simply forgot about the cue after it led them to the solution 
and so the cue was not available for a retrospective report 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1980). Also, a third of the subjects did 
notice the cue and reported it. Even if many of the subjects at 
no point were aware of the cue it would not follow that verbal 
reports are useless and unreliable in general. Verbal reports 
just do not tell us everything we want to know: “A protocol is 
relatively reliable only for what it positively contains, but not 
for that which it omits. For even the best-intentioned pro-
tocol is only a very scanty record of what actually happens” 
(Duncker, 1945, p. 11). Hence, the conclusion that verbal 
reports are generally unreliable and cognitive processes are 
introspectively inaccessible is much too strong. 
lImIted use of verbal reports In cognItIve scIence
In our experience, such extreme skepticism about verbal re-
ports as put forward by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) will not 
be found among people who work on problem solving. How-
ever, researchers in other fields, for example decision-mak-
ing, are likely to hold the view that verbal reports are useless 
for research in cognitive science. They do not need to rely on 
verbal reports to the degree that researchers in problem solv-
ing have to. Hence, unless the author of a textbook comes 
from a problem solving background, she is unlikely to see 
thinking aloud as an important methodology in cognitive 
science. In problem solving, a subject will often sit and think 
for quite a while before any overt behavior can be observed. 
Inferring everything that happened in this period from a few 
button presses is a very hard task. Even if you add eye track-
ing and brain imaging it will still be hard to figure out what 
is going on while the subject is thinking. As human subjects 
can speak, we can just ask subjects to report their thoughts in 
order to get more data. Researchers in problem solving will 
generally agree that think-aloud protocols can, at the very 
least, be useful for exploratory purposes or applied research 
(Crandall, Klein, and Hoffman, 2006). But researchers in 
problem solving are also generally aware of the work of Er-
icsson and Simon (1993) who argue convincingly that verbal 
reports can be more than a source of inspiration. Also, there 
are some excellent demonstrations of this beyond Newell’s 
and Simon’s work (e.g., Kaplan and Simon, 1990; van der 
Henst et al., 2002; VanLehn, 1991). 
However, even if a textbook author acknowledged the 
historical importance of verbal reports for some of the most 
influential works in problem solving, she might still be skep-
tical about the usefulness of verbal reports for future cogni-
tive scientists. Verbal reports are not widely used in research 
on perception, memory, categorization, decision making, or 
other successful fields of cognitive science. Even within prob-
lem solving they so far have not been that useful in overcom-
ing the impasse that the field is facing. Nobody follows the 
research strategy that Newell and Simon outlined in their 
book anymore. Nobody tries to derive detailed step-by-step 
computer simulations from protocol data anymore (Ohlsson, 
2012). As textbooks aren’t history books that’s a good reason 
to drop a topic or only mention it in passing. Ohlsson (2012) 
gives several reasons for why Newell’s and Simon’s approach 
never fully entered the cognitive science mainstream. First, 
different participants behave differently and protocol data are 
not easily pooled and summarized. Second, and related, col-
lecting verbal reports and performing a protocol analysis dif-
fers greatly from the usual methodology of experimental psy-
chology and statistical hypothesis testing. Third, the approach 
means a lot of hard work for the researcher. And fourth, after 
it was demonstrated that it could be done, “it became less and 
less clear what was gained by making it yet again” (Ohlsson, 
2012, p. 113). In the same vein, Batchelder and Alexander 
(2012, p. 69) note that for insight problem solving the data 
that verbal protocols provide beyond other behavioral mea-
sures have not led to any deep theoretical insights. 
In summary, most basic research in cognitive science has 
little use for introspection or thinking aloud. Researchers in 
problem solving have been more open towards verbal reports 
but after early successes, progress stalled and the insights-to-
effort ratio became very unfavorable. Together with the com-
mon historical rejection of introspection this could explain 
why many cognitive science textbooks do not cover verbal 
reports, not even in their problem solving chapters. This 
negative attitude towards introspection, and verbal reports 
in general, might have stopped researchers from using in-
trospection as an exploratory method or studying introspec-
tion as a cognitive process. However, both of these aspects of 
introspection might help overcome the current impasse in 
problem solving research, as we will argue below. 
IntrospectIon and exploratIon
Köhler in his foreword to the English translation of Dunck-
er’s monograph on problem solving (Duncker, 1945) writes: 
“It will be objected that any new endeavor which makes little 
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use of quantitative techniques must necessarily lack the pre-
cision of science in a strict sense. Let us not be impressed by 
this argument. . . . How do the critics plan ever to conquer 
difficult new ground if the absence of paved roads seems to 
them sufficient reason for keeping out entirely?” Köhler thus 
defended the think-aloud methods that Duncker used in his 
first studies on problem solving. Since the work of Newell 
and Simon (1972) verbal reports based on think-aloud meth-
ods have been used to develop and test detailed models of 
cognitive processing; and Ericsson and Simon (1980, p. 247) 
have defended the use of think-aloud methods against the 
“the careless charge of introspection as a means for disparag-
ing such data.” But even methods that are more problematic 
than thinking aloud, like classical introspection, can play a 
role in cognitive science. Once we look at introspection in 
the context of exploration rather than theory testing we can 
acknowledge the value of introspection. 
InteractIon between experImenter and subject
A central aspect of systematic experimental introspection 
as practiced by students of the Würzburg school was that 
subject and experimenter negotiated the protocol. The ex-
perimenter did not just record the verbal reports; she ac-
tively tried to understand what the subjects were trying to 
say and at times questioned them on details in order to get 
a protocol that was as complete and unambiguous as pos-
sible (Ach, 1905; Bühler, 1907). Everyone who has looked 
at think-aloud protocols knows the feeling of wanting to go 
back to the experiment in order to ask the subjects what they 
meant with certain utterances. Such clarifying interactions 
between subject and experimenter are carefully avoided in 
modern think-aloud methods. Ericsson and Simon (1993, p. 
xv) warn us that “to guarantee a close correspondence be-
tween the verbal protocol and the actual processes used to 
perform the task, this urge toward coherence and complete-
ness must be resisted.” Ach (1905, p. 17) thought otherwise, 
knowing that in his method “the experimenter plays a more 
prominent part than in any other psychological method” 
(translated by Titchener, 1909, p. 87). He was well aware of 
the potential problems of suggestion and confabulation that 
this approach might give rise to and tried to minimize their 
impact as much as he could. Bühler (1907, p. 306) explicitly 
agreed with Ach’s critics “that one will indeed have to look for 
an objective confirmation of the assertions of introspection.” 
However, in interaction with a participant, a knowledgeable 
and careful interviewer may be able to explore phenomena 
more quickly than it would otherwise be possible. 
The work by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) is an 
excellent recent example for research that is questionable 
by standard methodology but psychologically extremely in-
teresting. They revisited the Wason selection task (Wason, 
1968) but systematically engaged in a “Socratic dialogue” 
with their subjects. An experimenter who understands the 
logical and psychological issues involved and knows when 
to ask subjects to clarify their reasoning is invaluable when 
you want to get detailed insights into what a subject was 
thinking. The Wason selection task is a textbook example of 
how much cognitive scientists were able to find out about 
the black box by doing clever experiments that only observed 
easily quantifiable behavior. Still, when we read the excerpts 
of the protocols provided by Stenning and van Lambalgen 
we cannot help but notice how much richer than proposi-
tional logic subjects’ reasoning actually is. Stenning and van 
Lambalgen document a large number of non-classical rea-
soning processes in the protocols that are unaccounted for by 
current models. Although the Wason selection task was de-
signed to test simple propositional reasoning, the protocols 
provide evidence for many different reasoning schemata, go-
ing way beyond the ones that are discussed in the literature. 
Furthermore, we can read how the subjects struggle to estab-
lish an interpretation of the task. We can read how they try 
to understand what they are supposed to do and we can see 
the problems they have choosing between different reason-
ing schemata. Even if some of the subjects’ reports were ra-
tionalizations they would provide us with a much richer set 
of hypotheses about reasoning in the Wason selection task 
than usually considered.4 
IntrospectIng experImenters
While subject and experimenter were interacting in a social 
situation in the studies of both the Würzburgers and Sten-
ning and van Lambalgen, which is clearly problematic, they 
maintained the separation between subject and experimenter 
and the interaction happened in a controlled environment. 
Many experimentalists will oppose such methods publicly 
but it is our guess that, in private, many of them introspect 
themselves—which is methodologically even more question-
able—when exploring the phenomena that they study. In-
stead of sweeping this exploratory part of our research under 
the carpet we should be open and methodical about it. 
Kahneman (2011, p. 6) describes the exploratory part of 
his collaboration with Tversky in his recent book: “We quick-
ly adopted a practice that we maintained for many years. Our 
research was a conversation, in which we invented questions 
and jointly examined our intuitive answers. Each question 
was a small experiment, and we carried out many experi-
ments in a single day. . . . We believed—correctly, as it hap-
pened—that any intuition that the two of us shared would 
be shared by many other people as well, and that it would 
be easy to demonstrate its effects on judgments.” Of course, 
Kahneman and Tversky then went on to do their famous ex-
periments to check whether other people shared their intu-
itions, and this is a necessary step. However, if we spent more 
time exploring potential hypotheses through systematic in-
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trospection, we might start off with better hypotheses and ul-
timately conduct more interesting experiments. The routine 
that Kahneman describes is serving that purpose. 
In the context of problem solving research, someone who 
understands the theoretical issues involved in problem solv-
ing might be able to quickly observe and express patterns in 
her own problem solving behavior that a naive subject would 
not notice. You might also find these patterns by meticu-
lously working through verbal protocols or even by careful 
observation of overt behavior but where does the idea to look 
for these patterns come from? Task analysis is one answer, 
introspection is another. We do not claim that new and in-
teresting hypotheses about problem solving cannot be found 
by other means, but introspection might be a particularly ef-
ficient and easy way to develop new hypotheses. 
It could be argued that instead of leading to better hy-
potheses, introspection will merely lead us astray. This is an 
empirical question. While few cognitive scientists ever talk 
publicly about the informal introspections they engage in be-
fore they run an experiment, our own anecdotal experience 
is that we can quickly generate interesting hypotheses about 
how subjects perform a task by doing the task ourselves. In 
this way we can catch problems in an experiment even before 
we run it a pilot study and we get new ideas for data analy-
sis. Often we find that there are strategies that we did not 
think of before. This will be helpful if you want to constrain 
the task in a way that all subjects follow the same strategy 
or if you want to sort the subjects into groups that use the 
same strategy for an analysis. It can turn out that a strategy 
we thought to be plausible based on a task analysis requires 
too much working memory and cannot be executed in a pure 
form. Or we find that we try different strategies and switch 
back and forth. Often we find that we can do the task but we 
cannot discern any strategies that we become aware of easily. 
If we are worried that what we found in introspection may be 
idiosyncratic we will ask a colleague to do the task and ques-
tion her about how she did it. 
systematIc exploratIon wIth IntrospectIve methods
Why should we not discuss with each other how we think 
we solved a problem in order to generate plausible hypoth-
eses about the underlying processes? Why should we not try 
to develop a methodology for systematic introspection that 
can be used in exploratory studies? Of course, we have to be 
aware that these are only exploratory studies. But this does 
not mean we cannot be systematic and methodical about 
exploration. As there seems to be the general feeling that 
problem solving research is stuck (Batchelder and Alexander, 
2012; Ohlsson, 2012; van Rooij et al., 2011), perhaps, there 
is a need for more systematic exploration. Luckily, there are 
many systematic exploratory methods to be found in applied 
research that we can build on (e.g., Crandall et al., 2006). 
More concretely, several authors have recently suggested 
to collect a large set of standardized insight problems and use 
them to get a better empirical base in order to understand in-
sight problem solving (Batchelder and Alexander, 2012; Chu 
and MacGregor, 2011). Having standards in terms of prob-
lem difficulty and problem similarity will certainly be useful 
for designing and comparing studies. However, it is not im-
mediately clear what kind of studies can reveal the cogni-
tive processes involved in insight problem solving. One way 
forward could be a large-scale and systematic exploratory 
study. As cognitive scientists we have standard methods for 
hypothesis testing, but what is our methodology for explora-
tion? An obvious suggestion is to collect a large database of 
think-aloud protocols for a set of standardized and well-un-
derstood insight problems and then work through the pro-
tocols in the hope of finding something interesting or being 
able to systematize problem solutions or search strategies. 
Ohlsson (2012, p. 112) has described this approach to be like 
“natural history” where “you collect interesting specimens, 
dissect them carefully, and report what you find.” However, 
this approach means a lot of effort for an unclear outcome, 
especially as it is not even clear how the massive amounts of 
data will be analyzed and there are no obvious ways to auto-
mate this process.5
Also, as noted above, problem solving protocols have been 
collected in the past (though not on a massive scale) and have 
not led to many deep insights beyond what we know already. 
Still, we would like to browse through such a database of 
protocols for inspiration. Collecting such a database would 
probably require a huge collective effort of the whole field. 
Other possibilities are also laborious but perhaps easier 
to implement. For example, using a large set of insight prob-
lems, one could screen for particularly successful problem 
solvers and interview them about their strategies. Some of 
them might have interesting hypotheses about how they do 
it. Some might even have explicit conscious strategies that 
can serve as a starting point for further investigations. 
On a more fine-grained level, we can also follow in the 
footsteps of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) and engage 
in a Socratic dialogue with participants who are solving in-
sight problems. Think about this as online data analysis by the 
experimenter. By carefully listening to the subject and asking 
the right questions, a knowledgeable experimenter can iden-
tify interesting phenomena in the moment that they occur. 
In this way the experimenter can try to clarify what was go-
ing on immediately after something interesting happened. In 
the second edition of their book, Ericsson and Simon (1993, 
p. xvi) point out that their earlier criticism of retrospective 
reports does not apply to reports that are collected imme-
diately after a mental event happened. Hence, carefully con-
ducted interviews might be less problematic than previously 
thought. For exploratory purposes such a method could be 
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vastly more efficient than transcribing complete protocols 
and analyzing them offline with no way to later clarify cru-
cial utterances. We think that this is a good reason to try and 
develop such methods further. 
Another possibility is for researchers to solve many insight 
problems themselves, introspect or think-aloud while doing 
it, and keeping voice recordings and meticulous notes about 
what they could observe. Assuming that, with some practice, 
it is possible to work on a problem and intermittently intro-
spect what you are doing, a knowledgeable researcher might 
quickly discover interesting conjectures about her own prob-
lem solving behavior. If several researchers solved the same 
problems they could compare their observations and might 
thereby achieve some limited degree of objectivity. 
We fully understand the reservations that cognitive scien-
tists have against such proposals. However, lacking an estab-
lished and accepted methodology for exploratory studies in 
cognitive science, we will have to try different methods, com-
pare them to each other, and develop them further. Given 
the current theoretical block in problem solving research, we 
think that there is a need for systematic exploration. The tools 
that are available, think-aloud protocols and psychometric 
methods, are rigorous but inefficient. At the very least, in-
trospective methods can trade rigor for efficiency. Moreover, 
instead of outright rejecting the possibility that introspection 
might be useful as a method to investigate problem solving, 
perhaps we should investigate when it is helpful and when 
misleading. In their efforts to develop and understand think-
aloud methods Ericsson and Simon (1993) have also docu-
mented what we know about introspection. Their framework 
for interpreting verbal data can also help us interpret intro-
spective data. We are far from understanding the processes 
involved in introspection completely but we know a lot more 
about them than the Würzburgers did 100 years ago. “We 
surely could proceed more safely if we knew precisely in how 
far we can trust introspection; but how will we find out if we 
do not try it out?” (Bühler, 1907, p. 306) 
IntrospectIon and metacognItIon
We have argued that introspection is useful as an exploratory 
tool in problem solving research. This is a methodological 
reason to care about introspection. But we also think that the 
cognitive processes involved in introspection are key to un-
derstanding problem solving behavior. Our own experience 
as problem solvers suggests to us that conscious self-observa-
tion, self-monitoring, self-reflection, and other metacogni-
tive processes related to introspection play a big role in prob-
lem solving—especially, when it comes to solving new and 
hard problems. As we will review below, it has been found 
in several studies that the instruction to introspect improves 
subjects’ problem solving performance, sometimes dramati-
cally. Trying to understand the metacognitive processes un-
derlying these improvements is a promising approach for 
understanding problem solving in general. 
reactIve and non-reactIve verbalIzatIon
We have noted above that there are differences between 
thinking aloud and introspection and that the former seems 
methodologically less problematic than the latter. Particu-
larly relevant for problem solving research is the cognitive 
difference between introspective and think-aloud methods. 
This cognitive difference is usually discussed in the context 
of the question of whether the method that we use to study 
thinking interferes with the processes of thinking that we 
want to study. It is not hard to find quotes in the literature 
that dismiss introspection for this reason. For example, Hull 
(1920, p. 8) in discussing the work of Fisher (1916) states: “It 
is difficult to say what influence her constant and elaborate 
introspections had upon the process, though it is safe to as-
sume that such an amount of irrelevant mental activity was 
not without its effect.” 
As this is a serious concern, Ericsson and Simon (1993) in 
their defense of think-aloud methods had to convince other 
researchers that think-aloud methods do not interfere with 
the normal course of thinking. In other words, they had to 
show that the verbalizations obtained under think-aloud in-
structions are not reactive. By varying instructions and com-
paring performance measures with and without verbaliza-
tion it is possible to study the influence of verbal reports on 
thinking. Ericsson and Simon (1993) reviewed several such 
studies and argued convincingly that think-aloud meth-
ods are indeed not reactive and the performance with and 
without verbalization was very comparable in most cases. A 
recent meta-analysis strongly corroborates this conclusion 
(Fox, Ericsson, and Best, 2011). 
The key for non-reactive verbalization is that subjects only 
utter the thoughts that they are having anyway, probably in 
the form of inner speech. However, when subjects explain 
what they are thinking to the experimenter in a social situa-
tion (as in the study of Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004) 
or when the experimenter as a subject explains to herself 
what she is thinking, subjects will have to think about their 
own thinking. Hence, in introspective methods subjects will 
attempt to consciously reflect on their thoughts in order to 
understand, and be able to explain their reasoning. The in-
struction to introspect triggers metacognitive processes. We 
imagine that subjects pause from time to time to reflect on 
what they have just thought and how they have proceeded. 
They will try to organize their thoughts so that they can be 
communicated clearly. These reflections may well change the 
course of thinking. Therein we see the cognitive difference 
to think-aloud instructions where subjects “merely” report 
what they are thinking without further reflection. In fact, it 
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can be demonstrated experimentally that contrary to think-
aloud instructions the instruction to explain one’s think-
ing—which is a part of introspective methods—is reactive 
and changes subjects’ performance on problem solving tasks. 
posItIve effects of the InstructIon to explaIn
When Ericsson and Simon (1993) reviewed studies that used 
think-aloud methods and argued that they were not reac-
tive, they also reviewed studies that used other instructions 
for verbalization. They found that the instruction to explain 
one’s thoughts to the experimenter usually has a positive 
effect on problem solving performance and a recent meta-
analysis confirms this impression (Fox et al., 2011).6
Explaining your reasoning or your reasons to behave in a 
certain way is an important aspect of introspective methods. 
It is this aspect that is most criticized and which thinking 
aloud improved on. From a methodological point of view it is 
questionable to use introspective methods because they inter-
fere with subjects’ “normal” thinking (not to speak of the dan-
gers of suggestion, confabulations, rationalizations, and post-
hoc folk-psychological explanations). But as a phenomenon 
in problem solving it is intriguing that performance can be 
improved by asking subjects to explain their reasoning to the 
experimenter. Given the big positive effects that introspection 
can have on problem solving, it is no surprise that it has been 
suggested that educational psychology could use these results 
to improve problem solving performance (e.g., Dominowski, 
1998; Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Reither, 1979). 
For example, the Wason selection task with concrete ma-
terials leads to more choices that are consistent with material 
implication than the abstract version. Even if subjects work 
on the concrete version first, transfer to the abstract version 
will usually be poor. However, subjects who have to explain 
their reasoning to the experimenter show a substantial trans-
fer effect (90%) whereas subjects who are not required to 
explain their reasoning do not (only 27%) (Berry, 1983). It 
is quite conceivable that introspecting and explaining made 
subjects aware of the possibility of transfer. Noticing the rel-
evance of a hint or the possibility for transfer is a crucial fac-
tor in successful problem solving (Gick and Holyoak, 1980). 
The effect of verbalization on problem solving has also 
been studied with the Tower of Hanoi problem (Gagné and 
Smith, 1962). Subjects usually practice with easy versions and 
are then asked to solve hard versions in a transfer test. Sub-
jects who are asked to give reasons for each move are much 
better at finding the general principle required to solve the 
hard versions. In one study, the close to optimal performance 
of the 14 subjects who gave reasons suggests they all acquired 
a sufficient, if only partial, understanding of the principle. 
The other 14 subjects who did not have to give reasons for 
each move showed a much worse performance that makes 
it extremely doubtful that they understood the principle. A 
hand-waving explanation for the increased performance is 
that “verbalization somehow forced the [subjects] to think” 
(Gagné and Smith, 1962, p. 17). 
Trying to verbalize one’s thoughts presumably helps to or-
ganize one’s thoughts. This would be consistent with everyday 
experience that strongly suggests that people often verbalize 
while they think. It would also be consistent with teachers’ 
recommendations to explain material to someone else or to 
yourself. Students who explain material to themselves show 
a better performance on transfer tasks than students who 
do not. In addition, prompting students to generate expla-
nations improves understanding (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, and 
LaVancher, 1994; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, and Glaser, 
1989). However, it is not verbalization alone that improves per-
formance. Obviously, the generation of explanations is a more 
complicated process than mere verbalization as in thinking 
aloud. Reither (1979) asked participants to self-reflect, rather 
than to explain, and he also found that performance improves 
(a summary in English can be found in Dörner, 1979). This 
suggests that metacognitive processes play a key role for the 
observed improvements. In some think-aloud protocols that 
were collected while students learned from worked examples 
around 40% of the statements are self-monitoring statements. 
Good problem solvers do not necessarily show relatively 
more self-monitoring statements than poor problem solvers 
but they report more comprehension failures, suggesting that 
they are better at self-monitoring (Chi et al., 1989). Of course, 
for hard problems poor problem solvers quickly realize that 
they do not understand anything and hence they also show 
comprehension failures, so what is the difference? Some of 
the good problem solvers who spontaneously generated self-
explanations systematically used the worked examples to self-
monitor their understanding; the poor problem solvers did 
not do that (Renkl, 1997). Probably, good problem solvers 
who are systematic about self-monitoring notice specific com-
prehension failures that help them diagnose problems and 
they have strategies to do something about them. 
Later experiments with the Tower of Hanoi problem also 
demonstrated that verbalizing per se does not improve prob-
lem solving but triggering metacognitive processes does. In 
particular, paying attention to the processing level and becom-
ing aware of what one is doing seem to be important. Berar-
di-Coletta, Buyer, Dominowski, and Rellinger (1995) asked 
participants to think about the following questions: “1. How 
are you deciding which disk to move next? 2. How are you 
deciding where to move the next disk? 3. How do you know 
that this is a good move?” These questions can be thought of as 
asking subjects to explain their reasoning but they can also be 
considered as an instruction to introspect systematically. In-
terestingly, participants’ performance will improve even if they 
do not verbalize their thoughts. When they do, however, it can 
be seen in the protocols that participants who were asked to 
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think about the processing level focused more on planning, 
sub-goaling, error monitoring, strategy evaluation, and strat-
egy modification than control groups. Presumably the focus 
on these metacognitive activities led to the increase in perfor-
mance (Berardi-Coletta et al., 1995). 
metacognItIve processes In strategy acquIsItIon
The obvious question to ask now is: can we describe the pre-
sumed metacognitive processes underlying the improved 
performance in more detail? As Ericsson and Simon (1998, p. 
182)7 put it: “Thinking aloud has now gained acceptance as a 
central and indispensable method for studying thinking . . . , 
and it is time to start examining the mechanisms mediating al-
ternative “reactive” modes of verbalization, such as giving ver-
bal descriptions and explanations of one’s thinking ” in order 
to understand the “transforming power of reflective thought.” 
Reflective thinking can be triggered by the instruction to in-
trospect and improves problem solving. Hence, the additional 
metacognitive processes that are involved in introspection are 
often not “irrelevant mental activity.” They are an important 
part of the cognitive processing that we want to study in prob-
lem solving research (Dörner, 1979; Reither, 1979). 
In the Tower of Hanoi problem explaining one’s thoughts 
is particularly useful in the beginning when subjects have to 
assemble a strategy but before skilled and automatic process-
es can be used (Ahlum-Heath and Di Vesta, 1986). Can we 
describe and model the meta-strategies that successful prob-
lem solvers use when they assemble a strategy? Based on the 
studies by Berardi-Coletta et al. (1995) and Chi et al. (1989) 
it is reasonable to assume that conscious introspection, as a 
cognitive process, plays a central role in inventing problem 
solving strategies when difficult new kinds of problems are 
encountered. Once strategies have been assembled, they can 
be automatized and perhaps even be executed unconsciously. 
Still, self-observation, self-monitoring, and self-reflection—
that is, introspective processes—as triggered by the instruc-
tion to explain, often seem crucial for improving one’s strate-
gies and for coming up with a sensible strategy to start with. 
Consciously realizing that one is stuck or that one has had an 
insight can lead to decisions to change one’s strategy. To do 
so sensibly, you have to have the ability to monitor and con-
trol the execution of your problem-solving algorithms. We 
imagine this to be a little like debugging or optimizing your 
code in programming (Sussman, 1973). You systematically 
test your program and realize that your algorithm gives a 
wrong answer, is too slow, gets stuck in a local maximum, or 
is not terminating after the time you are willing to wait. What 
do you do? You look at the execution trace to identify the 
problem and then modify the program accordingly. If these 
speculations about the importance of introspective processes 
for problem solving were to be considered seriously, how 
should one study these metacognitive processes? 
Anzai and Simon (1979) have analyzed the think-aloud 
protocol of one subject in the Tower of Hanoi problem, de-
scribed her different strategies at different time points, and 
made some concrete suggestions about how the strategies 
were acquired as a consequence of earlier behavior. They 
worked in a production system framework. In production 
systems “re-programming” means acquiring new production 
rules, so they asked themselves how new production rules 
could be acquired. They found it necessary to add rudimen-
tary metacognitive processes that monitor success, access ex-
ecution traces, and generate new rules. Although their system 
can simulate the transitions between strategies, this cannot, 
however, be taken as evidence that this is how the subject ac-
quired her strategies. VanLehn (1991, p. 2) noted that models 
of strategy acquisition are “vastly underdetermined” and that 
many other models have been suggested since the original 
work of Anzai and Simon (1979). Ideally, we would like to 
have more fine-grained, process-level data about the strategy 
acquisition process which, presumably, is what differentiates 
good from bad problem solvers. In the language of develop-
mental psychology, we need microgenetic studies (Siegler 
and Jenkins, 1989). We would like to repeat what Newell and 
Simon have done for analyzing weak search methods by de-
tailed protocol analysis for strategy acquisition methods. 
In this spirit, VanLehn (1991) has tried to find the rule-ac-
quisition events in the protocol that was previously analyzed 
by Anzai and Simon (1979). He found that the vicinity of 
the first use of a production rule in the protocol did not give 
any hints as to how the rule was acquired. VanLehn (1991) 
argued that the subject approached the problem of strategy 
discovery in a scientific way. She developed hypotheses and 
tested them. For example, sometimes she would deliberate-
ly ignore established rules to try new ones. VanLehn could 
identify several rule acquisition events. Some of them were 
accompanied by clear statements that directly shed light on 
the process, but most were merely reflected as pauses in the 
protocol or “visible excitement . . . as if [the subject] knew 
that she had discovered something general about the puzzle” 
(VanLehn, 1991, p. 37). As usual, the think-aloud protocols 
were incomplete. They still suggested several mechanisms 
and VanLehn could give quite detailed reconstructions of 
some rule-acquisition events. 
The approach of analyzing protocols in order to develop 
detailed strategy acquisition models has been reasonably suc-
cessful. In a later paper, VanLehn (1999) fitted his Cascade 
model of strategy acquisition and self-explanation to the 
think-aloud protocols of Chi et al. (1989). Cascade falls into 
the class of impasse-repair-reflect models that have rudimen-
tary metacognitive abilities but are considerably simpler than 
a full-fledged metacognitive architecture (Cox, 2005; Cox, 
Oates, and Perlis, 2011; Sun, Zhang, and Mathews, 2006). 
VanLehn (1999, p. 105) concisely summarizes his work: 
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps October 2013 | Volume 6 | Issue 1
F. Jäkel and C. Schreiber Introspection in Problem Solving
30
The results bring both good news and bad news for Cas-
cade and similar impasse-driven learning models. The 
good news is that there are indeed learning events, and 
many of them can be modeled by the simple impasse-
repair-reflect cycle. Participants seldom speak coher-
ently about their learning events, but there is evidence 
for them even in verbal protocols, which are notorious 
in their incompleteness. 
The bad news is that the impasse-repair-reflect cycle 
is too simple to model all the observed learning, and 
even the learning-as-self-debugging paradigm might 
be too simple. Human students appear to be capable 
of doing everything that good programmers do in de-
veloping their programs, except that students are de-
veloping their own knowledge. That is, good students 
can debug their knowledge and can even plan and 
execute tests that will detect flaws in their knowledge. 
Moreover, the literature suggests that students can no-
tice opportunities for optimizing their knowledge and 
perhaps even use their knowledge in a kind of reflec-
tive, single-step mode that simultaneously checks the 
knowledge and executes it.
One way to overcome the impasse in problem solving re-
search could be to collect more process-level data on self-
programming and self-debugging. Otherwise it will be very 
hard to develop computational models of these crucial prob-
lem solving processes. Obtaining these data will be a lot 
harder than collecting think-aloud protocols and creating 
problem-behavior graphs as Newell and Simon did it. The 
main reason is that subjects spend a considerable amount of 
time executing strategies and only comparatively little time 
on developing new strategies. As the interesting metacogni-
tive episodes are short and rare, think-aloud protocols give 
only very sparse information about the processes of strategy 
acquisition. VanLehn’s work was successful but he had to 
comb through hours and hours of protocols to find a very 
small number of interesting events. 
There are two reasons why VanLehn’s approach has not been 
copied very often and the field has not made much progress on 
finding the mechanisms underlying self-programming. First, 
self-programming requires self-observation, self-monitoring, 
and self-reflection, that is, introspection. This will keep many 
cognitive scientists who are skeptical of introspection from 
studying these processes. Second, even if someone wants to 
study these processes, the effort of collecting hours of verbal 
protocols to get a little bit of data will be immense. 
Both blocks can be removed if we embrace introspec-
tion and use introspective methods more aggressively. We 
could use the Socratic methods outlined above as online data 
analysis. Perhaps, if we asked the subjects immediately after 
they display “visible excitement” of understanding to report 
more details, we could get more data at the time-points that 
we are most interested in. Alternatively, we could ask expert 
problem solvers to introspect and explain their strategy-ac-
quisition strategies while they solve many new problems and 
develop many new strategies. If the introspective methods 
are reactive, so what? If this increases the frequency of inter-
esting strategy acquisition events in the protocols, we should 
embrace these methods. In general, we want to make sure 
that subjects actually engage in the kind of metacognitive 
processing that we assume to underly successful problem 
solving. Hence, as one means to that end, we should not be 
afraid of using reactive methods and explicitly instruct prob-
lem solvers to introspect and explain. 
conclusIon
As research on problem solving appears to be stuck, our sug-
gestion is to relax the strict methodological criteria that many 
cognitive scientists impose on themselves, at least for a while. 
We suggest that we should spend more time on exploratory 
studies using introspection and verbal reports. Getting a bet-
ter feel for the problem solving phenomena that we want to 
explain probably has to predate an elegant theory and rigor-
ous experiments. We should, however, not make the mistake 
of going back to casual and undocumented introspection in 
single researchers. As a field we will have to be systematic and 
methodical about introspection if we want to make progress 
in this way. This will require us to understand the processes 
underlying introspection and to develop methodologies for 
reliably collecting introspective data. 
Revisiting introspection is not only a methodological rec-
ommendation that we want to make. The widespread rejec-
tion of introspection has also stopped us from considering 
its cognitive role in problem solving. However, introspective 
processes are often crucial for successful problem solving. In 
particular, strategy acquisition depends on self-observation, 
self-monitoring, and self-reflection. There is a large literature 
on metacognition that we can build on, and some of it, es-
pecially in educational psychology, even relates to problem 
solving (Bransford, Sherwood, Vye, and Rieser, 1986; Brown, 
1987; Davidson, Deuser, and Sternberg, 1994; Davidson and 
Sternberg, 1998; Roberts and Erdos, 1993). Metacognition is 
a much wider term than introspection, but self-observation, 
self-monitoring, and self-reflection are clearly key aspects of 
metacognition. As reviewed above, the instruction to intro-
spect can have a big positive effect on problem solving per-
formance. Trying to understand how exactly these improve-
ments come about seems to be a very promising strategy for 
overcoming the current impasse in problem solving research. 
Probably the improvements are not due to introspective pro-
cesses alone but also involve other cognitive and metacogni-
tive processes. The instruction to explain one’s thinking is a 
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trigger for all these processes that in many studies we want to 
avoid because they change the “natural” course of thinking. 
But in the study of problem solving, particularly if we want 
to shed light on how exactly humans invent problem solving 
strategies, we should be very interested in the “transforming 
powers of reflective thought” (Ericsson and Simon, 1998). 
Hence, if we want to study successful problem solving, it will 
be a good idea to make sure that subjects engage in reflec-
tive thought, for example, by instructing them to introspect. 
Instead of dismissing introspection as a flawed methodology, 
we should study the role of introspection in problem solving. 
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notes
1. As Alan Newell once put it: “As soon as we got the protocols they 
were fabulously interesting. They caught and just laid out a whole 
bunch of processes that were going on. . . . My recollection is that 
I just sort of drew GPS right out of Subject 4 on Problem D1—all 
the mechanisms that show up in the book, the means-ends anal-
ysis, and so on” (McCurdock, 1979, p. 212). We thank Sashank 
Varma for pointing us to this quote (see also Varma, 2011).
2. Some might conjecture that the main reason is that the work 
of the Würzburg school is not accessible in English. However, 
useful summaries have been available for a long time (Boring, 
1953; Humphrey, 1963; Mandler and Mandler, 1964).
3. Neisser (1967) is, of course, an exception but he mentions 
Newell’s and Simon’s early work in passing.
4. For another example see Fellows (1976) who reports that talking 
to his subjects changed his view on three-term series problems.
5. Titchener (1909, p. 89f) already noted in a footnote to a dis-
cussion of the systematic experimental introspection of Ach 
(1905): “Messer’s paper fills 225 pages of the Archiv f. d. ges. 
Psychologie, and at least half of these are in fine print. There 
can be no doubt that the method of ‘systematic experimen-
tal introspection,’ whatever its advantages, runs to bulk. If it 
comes into general use, and still more if, as Ach proposes, the 
conversations between experimenter and observer, the intro-
spective interviews, are taken down by phonograph and stored 
for future reference, we shall be forced to employ a staff of ‘in-
trospective computers’ to render our materials manageable.”
6. It should be mentioned that there are also cases where problem 
solving performance deteriorates with verbalization. Thoughts 
might not be easy to verbalize and trying to verbalize them can 
interfere with non-verbal thinking, an effect that is called ver-
bal overshadowing. Insight problems have been studied most 
in this context and the data seem to be mixed (Chu and Mac-
Gregor, 2011). Still, it has been found that for some insight 
problems explaining one’s reasoning decreases the probability 
of solving the problem (Schooler, Ohlsson, and Brooks, 1993). 
But the effect is small compared to the large positive effects 
reviewed here (see also Fox et al., 2011). 
7. Thanks to Oke Martensen for referring us to this paper and 
this quote.
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